This paper deals with public good provision and rent-seeking in an economy consisting of two regions with di¤erent preferences over public good consumption. The government either provides a national public good or two regional public goods with spillover e¤ects. Since public expenditures are …nanced by general taxation, individuals in both regions try to in ‡uence policy-making in their preferred direction. Interesting results emerge from the analysis and in particular: rent seeking or in ‡uence activities for a national public good are increasing in the degree of heterogeneity across regions and there are also increasing in the degree of spillovers of local public goods.
Introduction
While Western European countries are engaged in a process of economic and political integration that is unprecedented in their history, Eastern Europe provides dramatic illustration of swift collapse of political and economic union. These recent developments have led economists to study the size distribution of nations from a political economy point of view. These studies attempt to isolate the economic and political forces a¤ecting the integration and separation of sovereign states. In this literature, integration reduces interstate transaction costs but increases intrastate transaction costs. The former costs have an economic nature and correspond, for example, to exchange transaction costs or to the accommodation costs to the standard or to the legislative system of the other countries. It can also be the opportunity from unexploited economics of scale in the provision of public goods. The latter costs have a political nature, as larger states are likely to have a more heterogeneous population in several dimensions (endowments, preferences, culture...) 1 .
Because political separatism entails some economic and e¢ciency costs, we should observe that there is still some heterogeneity within the population of a particular nation. In other words, even if there is more place for taking into account heterogeneity, nation which are mainly characterized by the provision of public goods must still deal with the preference's heterogeneity of citizens. Notice that this is argument is closely related to the large public …nance literature inspired by Tiebout's model. Tiebout (1956) argued that the heterogeneity problem could be mitigated by the mobility of people across jurisdictions. People 'vote with their feet' and sort themselves into the communities that provide the public 1 For a survey of this literature, see Alesina et al. (1995) or Bolton et al. (1996) .
good they want. However subsequent literature has pointed out several problems with Tiebout solution, such as the restricted number of jurisdictions, the multidimensional nature of public goods, limitations to mobility or economics of scale in public good provision. In addition, there often exist legal constraints to extreme segregation by a particular group of people. Thus, despite the possibility of sorting, heterogeneous preferences will not disappear in practice.
In this paper a political economy model is set up to analyze the in ‡uence of preference's heterogeneity on public good provision and on rent-seeking of interest groups. More precisely, we consider a nation consisting of two regions that bene…t to a di¤erent degree from public good consumption. We analyze two di¤erent regimes: one in which the government provides a unique national public good and the other in which the government provides two local public goods, one for each region, with positive spillovers. Public goods in the two regimes are …nanced by general taxation at the centralized level. In other words, policy-making is centralized and public spending is …nanced by a uniform head tax on all citizens.
Because regions value di¤erently public good consumption, individuals have an incentive for rent-seeking to in ‡uence the policy and public good provision in their preferred direction. In this paper, rent-seeking is analyzed in a simple model of political equilibrium. The government is assumed to maximize the weighted aggregate welfare of the two groups. The respective weight of each group is determined by its rent-seeking expenditures. A …rst result is the following: when the two groups have access to the same power-seeking technology then, in equilibrium, the in ‡uence of one group exactly cancels out the in ‡uence of the other group. This result is valid whatever the distribution of preferences and whenever the government provides a national public good or two local public goods. It means that the political e¤ec-tiveness of a particular group is determined not by its absolute e¢ciency but by its e¢ciency relative to the e¢ciency of others which has been …rst recognized by Becker (1983) . As a result, aggregate is always equal to 0 and the government supplies the same level of public goods as without rent-seeking.
Still, rent-seeking expenditures depend on the degree of heterogeneity across regions and on the type of public good (pure or local) that is provided by the government. When the government provides a unique national public good, both groups spend rent-seeking expenditures to in ‡uence policy only if they do not have the same preferences for public good consumption. More importantly, we show that rent-seeking expenditures by each interest group are increasing in the degree of heterogeneity across the two regions. If the government provides local public goods, both groups are always active even if they have the same preferences for public good consumption. In addition, rent-seeking pressures are more important than in the case of a pure national public good as long as the marginal utility of local public goods is high enough. We also show, quite unexpectedly, that the higher the degree of spillovers of local public goods the higher the levels of rentseeking expenditures. General taxation and the distribution of tastes for public good consumption across regions appear to be important features of these results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y reviews some related literature. Section 3 presents our political economy analysis for the benchmark of the provision of a pure public good. Section 4 considers the case where interest groups lobby for local public goods. Section 5 discusses some extensions of the analysis and concluding remarks appear in Section 6.
Related Literature
Our paper crosses the boundaries of several branches of the literature. First, this paper is related to recent literature on the political economy of the organization and size of government. For example, Alesina and Spoalore (1997) consider the optimal and equilibrium number of districts in a model that trades o¤ scale economies in public good provision against preference diversity. Bolton and Roland (1997) consider when a federation would likely to break up. In their analysis, there are two unequally wealthy regions that favour di¤erent redistribution policies and the trade-o¤ is between the political bene…ts of having a policy closer to individual regions' tastes and an exogenous cost of separation. Ellingsen (1998) analyses the positive and normative economics of centralization of a pure public good. Decentralized systems of governments lead to inter-regional externalities. An integrated jurisdiction will solve the externality problem but it entails other costs in particular a neglect of minority interest. All these papers consider the provision of a national (federal) public good and use the median voter framework. In our paper, heterogeneity of preferences is also a central phenomenon but we do not restrict the analysis to the case of a national public good. We also consider the case of local public good provision 2 . More importantly, our modelling of the policy-making process is quite di¤erent. The median voter framework is admittedly convenient from a theoretical point of view but not realistic. In most countries, individuals do not set economic policy directly but rather give the responsibility to their representatives. Also, in representative democracies, governments shape policies in response not only to the concerns of general electorate, but also to the pressures applied by special interest which is central in our analysis.
2 Ellingsen (1998) brie ‡y considers the extension to a local public good.
This paper is also related to the literature on …scal federalism and distributive politics initiated by Oates (1972) and by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson (1981) .
Following Oates' seminal work, recent papers, among others, by Lockwood (2001) and Besley and Coate (2000) , have focused on the political economy of centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods. These papers (see also
Cheikbossian, (2000)) consider a system as one in which public spending is …nanced by general taxation, but regions can receive di¤erent levels of local public goods.
Centralization of public good provision undermines cross-region externalities but entails a political cost which is a certain degree of uniformity in public spending across regions. In addition, policy is formed by elected regional representatives who eventually bargain in a national legislative. Our paper is related to that literature to the extent that national and local public goods are …nanced by general taxation. However, unlike this literature, we do not focus on the political economy of the organization of governments (between centralized and decentralized decisionmaking). We rather emphasize on the incentives for heterogeneous interest groups to in ‡uence centralized decision-making by the way of rent-seeking expenditures.
There is also a body of recent works which focuses explicitly on special interest politics. Becker (1983 Becker ( , 1985 …rst pointed out that because of their higher stakes, bene…ciaries of various programs are more likely to be politically organized. More recent contributions have focused on structural models of the political process, trying to identify which features of the political system confer in ‡uence on some groups rather than others. Persson (1998) provided a comprehensive survey of this literature and Helpman and Grossman (2001) wrote a monograph on this topic.
Our modelling of the political process is rather a reduced form with respect to this literature but this allows us to study how inter-regional heterogeneity over private versus public consumption a¤ect rent-seeking for di¤erent types of public goods which so far has been neglected by the literature.
Finally, there is a huge literature on the theory of rent-seeking initiated by seminal work of Tullock (1967) . Typically, this literature assumes a given structure of rent-seeking contest and studies its equilibrium outcome. In particular, one of the major concerns have been the chance of winning the contest depending on individual or group's characteristics and also the dissipation rate that is the ratio between the outlay made by the contestants and the prize at stake 3 . Despite the abundance of contributions, there appears to be very few papers on rent-seeking for public goods. Exceptions are Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990) or Baik (1993) .
There is however a crucial di¤erence between this type of literature and our analysis.
Indeed, we view rent seeking as a mean to increase political in ‡uence relative to other interest groups which in turn can a¤ect the policy of the government and public good provision and not as a mean of winning a particular (public or private)
prize.
3 Rent-seeking and the Provision of a National Public Good
We consider an economy consisting of two geographical regions. There are N individuals and each individual lives either in region A and region B. Let n A and n B be the number of individuals in regions A or in region B respectively with
There is no mobility across regions. We assume that individuals within each region are identical. More precisely they share the same preferences for public good consumption. However, there is heterogeneity of preferences across regions. There are thus two types people A and B, characterized by their locations 3 See Nitzan (1994) for a survey.
and their tastes for a public good. The public good is …nanced by general taxation at the centralized or national level. The tax is nondistortionary.
Let us now turn to the details of the model. There is only one purely private good and an individual of region j for j = A; B has the following quasi-linear utility function
where x j is the individual's consumption of the private good and G is the aggregate level of the public good. G can be interpreted such as infrastructure or public spending and may also be viewed in terms of risk sharing and redistribution. µ j > 0 (for j = A; B) is a taste parameter and represents how individuals of group j value public consumption relative to private consumption. The function H (:) is a twice di¤erentiable function and also satis…es the following conditions:
For example, one can consider the following class of functions:
The public good is …nanced by an equal lump-sum tax and we assume that unit cost of providing the public good is equal to 1. We also assume that exogenous income (y) is equal for everyone in society and su¢ciently high to always allow positive consumption of the private good. This implies together with quasilinearity of preferences that there are no wealth e¤ects. Using the government budget constraint, we then have
However, the con ‡ict concerning the desired level of public good may give both groups an incentive to in ‡uence policy through rent-seeking activities. To model political in ‡uence of rent-seeking, we use a simple two-stage policy game: in the …rst stage interest groups exert rent-seeking pressure on the government. In the second stage, the government chooses the level of the public good.
The government is assumed to maximize a weighted sum of the welfare of both groups. The respective weights Á A and Á B are determined by the level of rentseeking expenditures of the interest groups in the …rst stage of the game. Let W be the objective function of the government. We have
This set-up, as it has been shown by Coughlin rent-seeking can be introduced into this setting in a way that interest groups spend resources to reduce the uncertainty of the candidates.
To solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the policy game, the solution of the second stage is derived …rst 4 . Inserting Eq. (2) into Eq. (3) for j = A; B and maximizing Eq. (3) gives the following interior solution for the public good level that is chosen by the policy maker
where the function V is the inverse function of the derivative of H i.e. V (:) =
The level of public good provided in equilibrium is increasing in both taste parameters. Eq. (4) also shows how the political weights of both interest groups in ‡uence the equilibrium level of public good in the second stage of the policy
game. An increase in the political weight of group j, for j = A; B, a¤ects the level of public good according to
where V Á j (which is negative) is the derivative of V with respect to Á j . As a result
4 Because there are no resources constraints, the order of this game has no special importance.
The equilibrium conditions are the same if the decisions of the government and of the interest groups are made simultaneously. Our presentation of the rent-seeking game as sequential is for expositional felicity only.
In other words, the equilibrium level of public good increases (decreases) in the political weight of the interest group which values public good consumption more 
Political in ‡uence is therefore assumed to be an increasing and concave function of rent-seeking expenditures.
The interest groups are assumed to maximize the aggregate income of their members minus rent-seeking expenditures. Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantees that this choice is interior, and that it is completely described by the following …rst-order condition which has to be satis…ed for j = A; B with G o and dG o =dÁ j given by Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) respectively
Calculating dv j =dG o with v j given by Eq. (2), the …rst order condition can be rewritten as it follows
Note that
Inserting Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) into Eq. (8) for j = A; B gives the following …rst order conditions for the equilibrium level of rent-seeking expenditures
As a result, the level of rent-seeking expenditures r j that is optimally chosen by group j; for j = A; B, when it acts as if the pressure exerted by the other group is una¤ected by its behavior, is implicitly de…ned by
Inserting Eq. (5) into Eq. (10) we …nd that
Eq. (11) characterizes the optimal level of rent-seeking expenditures of one group (in this case group j) given that of the other group (group k). Therefore Eq.
(11) for j = A; B implicitly describes a system of two reaction functions. Solving this system, we obtain the Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking expenditures r Without specifying functions H and Á, it seems presumptuous to look for closedform solutions. Note however that the two reaction functions are quite similar.
Indeed, only the denominator of the second right-hand-side term di¤ers from one reaction function to the other. More precisely, it is apparent from Eq. (11) that the level of rent-seeking activity by group j is essentially a matter of the political activity of the other group. Indeed, the term which makes the di¤erence between reaction functions is Á k i.e. the political in ‡uence of the other group and it appears that, ceteris paribus, r j is increasing in Á k (Recall also that because Á is concave, dÁ=dr is a decreasing function).
More speci…cally, let express the ratio of the two implicit reaction functions
From this equation, we have Proposition 1 When both groups have access to same power-seeking technology, in equilibrium the in ‡uence of one group exactly cancels out the in ‡uence of the other group.
This result is important because it means that the political e¤ectiveness of a group is mainly determined not by its absolute e¢ciency but by its e¢ciency relative to the e¢ciency of other groups which has been …rst recognized by Becker (1983). To make it clear, consider that both groups have access to the same powerseeking technology (i.e. Á j (:) = Á k (:)). In that case, it is apparent from Eq. (12) that both groups spend the same level of rent-seeking expenditures in equilibrium.
Let r ¤ be the rent-seeking level in this symmetric equilibrium. It follows that both groups have the same in ‡uence on policy making i.e. Á A (r ¤ ) = Á B (r ¤ ) = Á and therefore aggregate in ‡uence is 0. We will see that this result also holds when the government provides two local public goods with spillover e¤ects from one region to the other.
With asymmetric rent-seeking technologies, the game will not be zero-sum in in ‡uence. Asymmetric political in ‡uence can result from di¤erent group's characteristics. For example, collective action may be less di¢cult to achieve in a small group than in a large group. Indeed, because individuals bear only partially the adverse consequences of their contributed e¤ort, collective e¤ort typically falls below the group-optimal level (see Olson (1965) ). This well-known free-rider problem can be partially controlled by putting in place a system of sanctions for deviant members but this is costly and the cost is likely to be increasing with the size of the group. A large group would therefore be less e¢cient at producing political pressure than a small group and this could be re ‡ected by di¤erent political in ‡u-ence function. We will go back to the case of asymmetric rent-seeking in the last section.
When both groups have access to the same rent-seeking technology Á, the equilibrium level of rent-seeking expenditures for both groups is implicitly de…ned by
The equilibrium rent-seeking level of both interest groups is strictly positive only if µ A 6 = µ B . When everyone has identical tastes, i.e. µ A = µ B = µ > 0, given assumption 2, there is no incentives to exert rent-seeking pressure i.e. r 
How does rent-seeking depend on the degree of heterogeneity? As it turns out, the answer hinges on the relative values of taste parameters. More speci…cally, we have Proposition 2 The level of rent-seeking expenditures by each interest group is an increasing function of jµ A ¡ µ B j.
Proof. Let note ¢ = (µ A ¡ µ B ) 2 and suppose, without loss of generality, that
. Calculating the derivative of b Á with respect to ¢ gives:
which is negative since Á is assumed to be concave. Therefore b Á is a decreasing function of r. Because the right-hand term of (14) is decreasing in ¢, r is increasing in
The above proposition states that political con ‡icts and rent-seeking activities are exacerbated by an increase in the polarization of preferences. An increase in resources brought about via political activities is a source of social deadweight loss to the extent that these resources are devoted to political activities (and then not used for productive activities). A proportional reduction in e¤orts by both politically active groups would reduce the overhead cost of the political process, without a¤ecting the overall disposition of government policies. Indeed, with heterogeneity of preferences, the group with a relatively high preference for public good consumption seeks to increase the public sector level; the group with a relatively low preference for public good consumption seeks to reduce it. In equilibrium the rentseeking-in ‡uence of one group exactly cancels out the in ‡uence of the other group, and the government supplies the same level of public good as without rent-seeking.
The political game is zero-sum in in ‡uence and negative-sum in rent-seeking expenditures. Our point is that an increase in polarization of preferences will not a¤ect the political equilibrium but will increase unproductive rent-seeking expenditures. This suggests that in a multi-regional state, the political e¤ort of every particular group to obtain preferential treatment for itself tends to threaten the interest of other groups. Consequently, each group is inclined to overinvest in the production of political in ‡uence. The political con ‡ict thereby engendered may be peaceful, as in well functioning democracies where groups lobby legislatures for particular favors, or may be violent in countries in which government functions poorly or have been captured by one group and used to exploit others.
Rent-seeking and the Provision of Local Public Goods
So far, we have con…ned attention to the case of a pure national public good which is available in the same quantity in each region. What if the government can provide public goods with local or regional speci…c bene…ts? To answer this question, we consider a situation in which the policy maker provides two regional public goods that spillover from one region to the other. There are still two types of people A and B with relative preferences for public good consumption µ A and µ B respectively and an individual lives either in region A or in region B.
A natural way of capturing this phenomenon within the model is to consider that individuals in region j for j = A; B have the following utility function
where g j and g k are public goods with local bene…ts in region j and region k respectively. One can still interpret g j and g k as public investments or local infrastructures. The parameter¯2 [0; 1] captures the spillover e¤ects from other region's public spending on the "home" region. When¯= 1(0) we are in the Samuelson case of a pure public good at the national (regional) level 5 .
We still consider that public spending in each region is …nanced by general taxation i.e. by an equal lump-sum tax at the national level and we assume that unit cost of providing the public good is equal to 1. Each individual, irrespective of the region he belongs to, as an exogenous income (y) that is su¢ciently high to always allow positive consumption of the private good. Using the government budget constraint, we have By solving dW=dg j = 0 for j = A; B; we obtain the following …rst-order conditions
where H gj denotes the derivative of H with respect to g j .
Let note G A and G B the levels of 'disposable' public goods for region A and B.
More speci…cally G A = g A +¯g B and G B = g B +¯g A : The …rst-order conditions then reduce to
where
Since H is concave, disposable public good in region j is increasing in µ j . Furthermore, an increase in the political weight of group j for j = A; B will a¤ect the equilibrium level of disposable public good according to
for group j and
for group k.
In the …rst stage of the policy game, both groups can raise their political in‡uence by making rent-seeking expenditures. Fellow group members decide collectively the level of their rent-seeking expenditures r j so as to maximize utility net of rent-seeking e¤ort. The following …rst order condition has to be satis…ed, for j = A; B, with G o j and dG o j =dÁ j given by (18) and (19) respectively
Observing that g A + g B = GA+GB 1+¯a nd calculating dv j =dG o j with v j given by Eq. (16), the …rst order conditions, for j = A; B, can be rewritten as it follows
For convenience in the exposition, let note V (¢ j )´V 
Eq. (23) implicitly de…ne best reaction functions for groups A and B. Solving this system, we obtain the Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking expenditures r 
Again, when the two groups have access to the same rent-seeking technology (i.e. Á j (:) = Á k (:)), they spend the same level of rent-seeking expenditures. Let r ¤ be the rent-seeking level in this symmetric equilibrium. It follows that both groups have the same in ‡uence on policy making i.e. Á A (r ¤ ) = Á B (r ¤ ) = Á. Eq. (23) then reduces to
where now
Since V Á A and V Á B are negative, rent-seeking expenditures are strictly positive in equilibrium. As long as the interest groups have access to same power-seeking technology, they neutralize each other in the political process. The government provides the same levels of local public goods as without rent-seeking. Proposition 1 still holds which strongly supports the view that the political e¤ectiveness of a group is determined not by its absolute e¢ciency but by its e¢ciency relative to the e¢ciency of the other groups.
To simplify the analysis and to clarify the exposition, let us consider the case of the isoelastic utility function H (G) = G 1¡® 1¡® . Then it is a matter of few computations to show that Eq. (25) reduces to
The …rst thing to notice is that, unlike in the case of a national public good, rent-seeking expenditures are strictly positive even if both groups share the same preferences for public good consumption. The intuition is simple. Public goods are …nanced by general taxation at the centralized level. However public goods have region speci…c bene…ts. This gives an incentive for each group to push for an expansion of g j since the tax burden is shared between the two groups. As a result, both interest groups will have an incentive to exert rent-seeking pressure for local public good consumption even if they have identical tastes.
The motive for rent-seeking is therefore quite di¤erent from that which drives political in ‡uence when the government provides a pure public good. In fact, inspection of Eq. (26) reveals that rent-seeking is increasing both in µ A and µ B 6 .
Since regions contribute equally to the national tax burden, both groups compete for public spending in their own region. Therefore their incentives for rent-seeking are increasing both in the home and other region's taste parameter.
Does it mean that rent-seeking by each interest group is higher when the government provides local public goods than in the case where it provides a unique national public good? The following proposition makes this point more precise Proposition 3 When both groups are of equal size and if the marginal utility of the public good is su¢ciently high then, in equilibrium, rent-seeking expenditures for local public goods are more important than for a national public good.
When both groups are of equal size i.e. n A = n B = n. Eq (14) and (26) which characterize the equilibrium levels of rent-seeking pressure for national and local public good reduce to
creasing function of r. Therefore, rent-seeking expenditures will be lower with a 6 In Eq. (25), µ A and µ B appear in the denominator and b Á is a decreasing function because of the concavity of Á. As a result, in equilibrium, rent-seeking is increasing both in µ A and µ B .
national public good than with local public goods if
. Rearranging the terms, we get that rent-seeking pressure for local public goods is higher than rent-seeking for a national public good only if
Inspection reveals that this condition is always satis…ed if ®¸1=2 7 . If the marginal utility of the public good is not decreasing too rapidly both interest groups exert more rent-seeking pressure for a local public good than for a national public good. Intuitively, because public expenditures have local speci…c bene…ts and because of the common …nancing, there is now two incentives for rent-seeking:
…rst, to obtain a public good that …ts the preferences of the region and second, to exploit the budgetary externality.
Again, rent-seeking causes a prisoner's dilemma situation for the interest groups and in equilibrium the rent-seeking in ‡uence of one group exactly cancels out the in ‡uence of the other group. The di¤erence with the case of a national public good is that now unproductive rent-seeking activities are more important which further decreases the welfare of both interest groups.
How does rent-seeking change with the degree of spillovers? We may think that the higher the level of inter-regional externalities of public spending the lower the incentives to engage in a costly rent-seeking process. Indeed, the size of the 7 Observe that the left-hand term is, for any¯> 1, strictly lower than 1 (because ® < 1).
The right-hand term is the product of two terms, one strictly lower than 1 and the other strictly higher than 1. For any values of µ A and µ B the right-hand term is strictly higher than 1 for ® = 1=2. Since the right-hand term is increasing in ®, we can conclude that the inequality is always satis…ed for any ®¸1=2.
externality¯is a measure of the relative importance of local speci…c bene…ts of public good provision. A high value of¯means that local speci…c bene…ts are of marginal importance. In this case the distributional con ‡ict between the two regions to attract public spending should be mitigated which would reduce the level of rent-seeking activities with respect to the case of a high value of¯. However, this intuition is misleading as indicated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4
The level of rent-seeking expenditures by each interest group is increasing in the degree of spillovers.
Proof.
Since by assumption Á is concave the left-hand term of Eq. (26) is decreasing in r. The right-hand term is a decreasing function of¯(recall that ® < 1). Therefore, r is an increasing function ofW hy this result? A possible explanation is the following. The two groups try to raise their political in ‡uence by increasing their rent-seeking expenditures.
The government provides two group speci…c public goods while total spending are …nanced by a uniform head tax on all citizens.¯indexes the degree of spillovers of these two public goods. When¯is low, individuals care principally about the public good in their own locality. The incentive to in ‡uence the government is then principally driven by the opportunity to exploit the budgetary externality as discussed above. Contrarily, when¯is approaching 1, both groups care equally about the public goods in both localities. Indeed, for each group, public good consumption is determined equally by the preferences of the fellow group members and those of the other group. Each group has thus strong incentive to lobby not only for a local public good which …ts the preferences of fellow group members but also for low provision to the other group to pay lower taxes. This can explain why rent-seeking is increasing in the degree of spillovers.
Extensions

Collective action and group size
So far, we have assumed that the cost of political pressure is equally shared between group's members. However, because political pressure is a public good, it can be subject to the problem of free-riding: each person wants to shirk his obligation and impose the cost of producing pressures on other members. When individuals decide non-collectively their rent-seeking activities the private marginal cost of rentseeking is 1. Therefore, the right-hand term in Eq (8) and (22) characterizing the …rst order conditions in the two regimes would be 1 instead of 1=n j . It follows that in the rent-seeking equilibrium, the marginal political e¤ectiveness of one group to the other would now be given by
If both groups have access to the same power-seeking technology, then
Proposition 5
The group with fewer individuals gets the larger in ‡uence on centralized decision-making.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that n A > n B then Eq. (28) can be rewritten as it follows We can …nd some empirical evidences. For example, the voting rules and allocation of votes to member nations in the EU Council of Ministers gives weights out of proportion to their size to relatively smaller nations. However, we probably need a micro-founded model of rent-seeking and of political in ‡uence to get further insights on the problem of free-rider within interest groups.
Many Interest groups
Another extension should be to consider that the economy is divided in several groups and the question is whether it increases or decreases the aggregate level of rent-seeking activities 8 . There are several e¤ects at work: on the one hand since each group counts less in the welfare objective function of the government, the incentive to engage in political in ‡uence instead of productive activities should be reduced because the relative e¤ectiveness of rent-seeking is reduced. On the other hand, a large number groups may exacerbate competition between them.
I have refrained from a full analysis of this extension of the model partly because it becomes quite complicated to handle with much more parameters and partly because the added insight is quite limited. However, few points are worth making.
Let …rst consider the case of a national public good. To focus on the impact of the number of groups on rent-seeking, let assume that there are I regions of equal size n and that each region except region j, has the same preferences over public good consumption i.e. 8i 6 = j, µ i = µ. Using the isoelastic utility function and after some computations, Eq. (14) characterizing the level of rent-seeking expenditures in the symmetric equilibrium is now given by
The result that we can get by calculating the derivative of b Á with respect to I is the following: if ® < 1=2 then rent-seeking expenditures are always (i.e. for any values of µ and µ j ) increasing in the number of groups when the government provides a national public good. In other words, when the marginal utility of public good is decreasing rapidly, an increase in the number of interest groups raises political competition for in ‡uence. When ® > 1=2 the result is ambiguous and depends on the relative values of the parameters (µ, µ j , ® and I). How to interpret the result? First notice that because there are (I ¡ 1) groups that share the same preferences, we can view the set up as one in which there is a competition between a small group and a large group. But there is a problem of free-riding among the large group since decisions are taken independently by the (I ¡ 1) groups with preferences µ. Therefore, the marginal bene…t of rent-seeking for group j is increasing in I which in turn increases rent-seeking by group j and by the other groups as well. This is because rent-seeking is driven by the opportunity to counteract the political in ‡uence of others.
Let now consider the case of the provision of local public goods. In that set up, regions are always active even if they share the same preferences for local public good consumption. Therefore, let assume that we have I groups of equal size n and with the same valuation µ for public good consumption. Eq. (26) characterizing the level of rent-seeking expenditures in the symmetric equilibrium is now given by
It is immediate that the derivative of b Á with respect to I is positive. Because b Á is a decreasing function of the r, this implies that in the symmetric equilibrium, the common level of rent-seeking expenditures is decreasing in the number of interest groups. This result is perhaps surprising. We could have thought that the larger the number of groups the higher the competition to exploit the budgetary externality as in a standard common pool set up. But in the light of Proposition 4, we can understand this result. Indeed, an increase in the number of groups for a given level of the degree of spillover¯has the same e¤ect that an increase in¯given I that is: from the point of view of each region, regional preferences are perceived to count less for the provision of local public goods. To overcome this e¤ect of dilution, each region has thereby strong incentives for rent-seeking.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that the political e¤ectiveness of a group is principally determined by its e¢ciency relative to the others as in Becker (1983) . When the government provides a pure public good, heterogeneity of preferences may aggravate distribution con ‡icts and thereby cause an increase in rent-seeking expenditures of interest groups. Such in ‡uence activities are even more important when the governments provides regional public goods. In addition, rent-seeking expenditures are shown to be increasing in the degree of spillovers. General taxation and the distribution of tastes are shown to be important features of the problem.
The model has several limitations. Let mention a few. While our framework can be relevant for di¤erent types of public goods, there are many policies which do not …t comfortably with it, for example, the study of laws, regulations or standards that may require a di¤erent model. Also, our analysis of the political making process would probably need more microeconomic foundations. Finally, we have limited the analysis of rent-seeking to the case of a …scally centralized system. We plan to explore in future research the impact of rent-seeking in other systems of government. Particularly, we would like to use the framework employed here to analyze rent-seeking in a federal organization that is a system which decentralizes to some extent policy choice at the regional level with a system of transfers and subsidies between localities. A recent paper by Alesina et al (2001) study how di¤erent institutional rules a¤ect public good provision in a federal system. Their analysis of the political making process is however given by the adoption of the majority rule. An important direction for future research would be to incorporate political pressure by di¤erent interest groups.
